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We find in cross-sectional investigations that wage restraint is either unchanged or increased 
following EMU in the vast majority of countries. This contradicts the predictions of a widely-
cited family of models of labor market bargaining. In those, Germany would have been 
expected to display the greatest decline in wage restraint post-EMU, and we find no 
indication of such a decline. The time-series evidence on Italy shows a significant increase in 
wage restraint after eurozone entry. This pattern is consistent with the models that emphasise 
the gains from monetary credibility. The eurozone increase in wage restraint is matched by 
the increase seen in the UK and Sweden after adopting inflation targeting, another means to 
credibility. 
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Has EMU Had Any Impact on the Degree of Wage Restraint? 
 




The Lucas Critique notwithstanding, applied economic research has paid a great deal of attention 
in recent decades to the potential for changes in monetary regimes to induce lasting changes in 
economic structures and behavior.
1 In particular, given the key role of inflation expectations in 
wage setting and the presumed endogeneity of practices such as indexation to the price 
environment, theorists have developed increasingly sophisticated models of the interaction 
between central banks and labor market institutions.
2  
The creation of the euro presents a natural opportunity to investigate these models’ 
predictions. Eurozone member countries’ economies, where wage bargaining institutions and 
practices varied substantially, suddenly underwent a simultaneous shift in monetary regime to 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the Eurosystem. This shift would not 
necessarily have had the same effect on all eurozone economies—the pre-existing extent of 
unionization, degree of centralization and coordination in wage bargaining, relative size of the 
economy in the monetary union, and so on could condition a given economy’s response.
3 Given 
this conditionality, theorists were generally building upon the insights of Calmfors and Driffill’s 
(1988) seminal paper on the interaction between centralization of wage bargaining and 
macroeconomic performance.
4 Interestingly, there was little agreement between the predictions 
of European theorists and policymakers. Labor economists and political scientists whose 
approach worked from wage bargaining institutions upward to macroeconomic outcomes tended 
to emphasize the risks to macroeconomic performance from Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) causing a mismatch between institutions, which might result in suboptimal coordination. 
                                                 
1 Lucas (1976) famously argued that known and lasting changes in economic policy would lead to offsetting private 
behavior such that policy changes would make little or no difference to economic outcomes. 
2 See, among others, Bean (1998), Bayoumi and Sgherri (2004), Calmfors (1998), Cukierman and Lippi (1999, 
2001), Duval and Elmeskov (2005), Gruener and Hefeker (1999), Hall and Franzese (1998), Iversen and Soskice 
(1998, 2000), Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2000), and Sibert and Sutherland (2000). 
3 Calmfors (2001) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) give useful albeit partial surveys of the factors involved. 
4 These authors acknowledge their debt in turn to Olson (1982), who first outlined why the behavior of interest 
groups depends upon how “encompassing” their membership is.   3
On the other hand, almost all eurozone macroeconomists and central bankers felt that short-run 
inflation and output volatility would generally improve with the monetary regime shift, and 
many went further, suggesting that more credible policy would percolate downward and induce 
structural reform in labor markets.
5 
  Two difficulties have limited the success of empirical inquiries into this issue. The first, 
well-recognized, difficulty is that the number of country observations available to investigators is 
limited, and so therefore is the degree of freedom to distinguish robustly among competing 
hypotheses.
6 The second difficulty is that the vast majority of empirical studies tend to focus on 
aggregate macroeconomic outcomes—normally inflation and/or unemployment—even though 
the underlying theory usually generates hypotheses about real wage determination.
7 The first 
difficulty is largely unavoidable, though with  time and with different cuts at the problem, some 
clarity may be achieved. The second difficulty, however, is unnecessary and may in fact 
exacerbate the first problem. If the competing theories have different implications for real wages 
or functions thereof, it may be possible to distinguish between them by looking directly at the 
predictions for those variables and thus not burn degrees of freedom (and  confuse the matter) by 
trying to control for shocks to inflation or unemployment or country-specific effects with respect 
to those variables. 
  This paper investigates the empirical implications of the various theories for EMU’s 
effect on wage restraint—the degree to which wage increases do or do not exceed productivity 
growth. In so doing, we attempt to avoid the seconddifficulty noted above. Wage restraint in 
some sense automatically controls for country-specific effects and shocks, beyond those directly 
accounted for in the observable labor and monetary institutions, because it is defined as a 
response to a given country’s productivity performance, not a function of the level. It is also 
explicitly and frequently cited as a primary conscious concern of labor leadership, employers, 
and central bankers, who are presumed to be the actors in these models—and in the reality of 
                                                 
5 Posen (1998a, 1999) expressed an early American skepticism on both these counts. Duval and Elmeskov (2005) 
and Posen (2005) both give references to statements by euro proponents pre-EMU that the euro would strongly 
induce if not force structural change. 
6 Blanchard (2005) is particularly articulate on the challenge presented to such cross-national datasets by the 
existence of a multiplicity of shocks. Calmfors (1993) and Driffill (2005) also note these limitations. 
7 Richard Freeman raised this concern in initial comments on Calmfors and Driffill (1988). This is not true of all 
empirical investigations (e.g., Layard, Nickell, and Jackman [1991] estimate wage equations before turning to 
unemployment outcomes), but most focus on inflation or unemployment directly. Some of the models, such as those 
of Cukierman and Lippi (1999, 2001), map directly from real wages to aggregate outcomes.   4
wage bargaining and monetary policymaking. We also hope to partially alleviate the first 
difficulty, of inherently limited observations, by focusing on this dependent variable rather than 
inflation or unemployment, the determinants of which are perhaps too difficult to pin down. To 
our knowledge, no paper in this context has made wage restraint itself the focus of its empirical 
work.
8 In addition, taking advantage of the time that has passed since the launch of the euro, we 
add to our cross-sectional work a comparison of time-series behavior in two critical countries, 
Germany and Italy, that differ markedly in what the theories predict would be the effect of EMU 
on wage restraint.  
  We find that wage restraint either is unchanged or has increased following EMU in the 
vast majority of countries, with no instances of significant declines in restraint. This finding 
contradicts the predictions of a widely cited family of models that rest on labor’s representatives 
in wage bargaining taking into account the external effect of their demands on aggregate 
inflation. In particular, one would have expected Germany to display the greatest decline in wage 
restraint under these models, given that the relative importance of its major unions in the central 
bank’s calculus of inflationary pressures declined most with respect to both size and weighting 
by the central bank (given the shift from Bundesbank to the ECB), and we find no indication of 
such a decline. If anything, wage restraint in Germany increased post-EMU.  
  The overall shift in the countries examined toward greater wage restraint is consistent 
with the models that emphasize the gains to macroeconomic stability from monetary credibility, 
downplaying coordination or labor centralization issues. The time-series evidence on Italy, 
which shows a significant increase in wage restraint after eurozone entry, also supports this view, 
given that the restraint is mostly determined by the degree of monetary credibility (proxied by 
the Italian interest rate differential versus the lowest government bond rate in the eurozone). That 
said, the increase in wage restraint associated with increased monetary credibility in the eurozone 
is matched by that shown to be associated with the increase in credibility seen in the United 
Kingdom and Sweden after adoption of inflation targeting post-1992. This result emphasizes that 
the effect being seen is due to monetary regime changes and perhaps global pressures on labor 
                                                 
8 Of course, the concept of wage restraint and its importance is well established. Bruno and Sachs (1985) first 
brought in the modern concept of the wage gap and related it to institutions, and many of the papers cited in footnote 
2 deal with real wage determination. Bean (1994, 2005), Blanchard (1991, 2000), Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 
(1991), and Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) all consider the role of real wage rigidities in determining 
unemployment. Yet, the empirical linkage between wage restraint and changes in monetary policy regimes to our 
knowledge remains uninvestigated.   5
bargaining power and not due to EMU per se,  political coordination issues, or international 
integration that accompanied EMU. 
  Section II further elaborates on our definition of wage restraint, its operationalization, and 
the distribution of outcomes in our sample. Section III goes through the implications of five 
major theories about the determinants of wage restraint for what should happen after EMU and 
whether or not non-eurozone advanced economies should see a similar effect. Section IV 
presents our cross-sectional analysis, looking at the extent of wage restraint before and after 
EMU in a sample of 19 economies (of which eleven are EMU members) and its determinants. 
Section V sets out our time-series analysis of the movements in wage restraint controlling for the 
business cycle in Germany and Italy and whether those dynamics changed after convergence in 
interest rates (our operationalization of monetary credibility) and the shift in monetary decision 
making from the Bundesbank to the ECB. Section VI considers the implications for two major 
theoretical approaches to the determinants of wage restraint and for policy, given what seems to 
be clear evidence in support of one and in apparent rejection of the other. 
 
II. ROLE AND MEASUREMENT OF WAGE RESTRAINT 
 
Central bankers and financial-market observers often refer to the degree of wage restraint in a 
country or in a given wage negotiation, by which they mean the degree to which increases in real 
wages are commensurate with increases in (labor) productivity. As argued by Bruno and Sachs 
(1985), the existence of a real wage gap—a persistent rise in real wages unmatched by 
productivity—can explain stagflation in the 1970s. In a more recent example, the extensive and 
persistent high unemployment in the former East Germany is usually attributed to a lasting wage 
bargain that overpriced eastern labor relative to its productivity.
9 Others (e.g., Ball and Moffitt 
2001, Blanchard and Philippon 2003) attribute part of the rise and in some countries fall of the 
nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) to the lags with which wage setters 
recognized shifts in productivity growth. This attribution is of course loosely analogous to 
“classical” views of unemployment, where labor is overpriced relative to its returns, as opposed 
                                                 
9 See the summary and references in Posen (2006, chapter 6). The “overpricing” in turn can be attributed to the 
incentives for union insiders in then West Germany to prevent low-wage competition for their membership.   6
to more “Keynesian” views where nominal rigidities and insufficient demand are the root 
cause.
10    
Assessment of wage restraint continues to play a significant role in the determination of 
monetary policy now that all central banks in advanced economies, including the ECB, are 
committed to forward-looking strategies for the stabilization of low inflation. The belief that 
wage increases “out of line with productivity” are potentially inflationary is widespread. 
Consider the example of the German economy and Bundesbank behavior in the 1950–70 period, 
when economic growth was accompanied by union wage restraint, with real wages rising but less 
than the rate of growth in productivity—and the Bundesbank explicitly threatened to raise 
interest rates should wage demands be “excessive” (Deutsche Bundesbank 1998, Streeck 1994 or 
Siebert 2005, chapter 4). The decline in the US unemployment rate in the 1990s is widely 
attributed in large measure to interaction between the outpacing of wage growth by productivity 
growth and the readiness of the Federal Reserve partly as a result to maintain low interest rates 
even as past benchmarks for growth and unemployment were surpassed.
11 
It must be noted that wage restraint is not an entirely neutral concept distributionally. An 
increase in wages above the rate of productivity growth will embody some combination of pass-
through of inflationary expectations, of (mis)perception of the rate of productivity growth, and of 
an increase in labor’s share of income relative to capital.
12 Since ultimately factors of production 
would be expected to earn their marginal products over the long term, this is less of an issue for 
multiyear averages than for any specific year’s wage settlement, but after some years of wage 
restraint, it could well be reasonable for labor’s share to catch up by growing above productivity 
temporarily.
13 As Caballero and Hammour (1996) and  Blanchard and Philippon (2003) point 
out, on average capital’s share of income has been rising along with unemployment in Europe 
                                                 
10 As Caballero and Hammour (1996) and Blanchard (2005) point out, though, even if a wage gap story can be used 
to explain much of the rise of European unemployment in the 1970s and early 1980s, it cannot be assigned a leading 
role in the persistence and, in some European countries, continued rise of unemployment in more recent years, 
precisely because there has been a period of relative wage restraint. 
11 Blinder and Yellen (2001) articulate this position very well from the point of view of Federal Reserve decision 
makers.  
12 As we are considering aggregate measures of wage restraint, we are abstracting from the bargaining over rents and 
quasi-rents between firms and unions, which are also a component of wage growth when considered at the sectoral 
or individual firm level. 
13 In current monetary policymaking, the analogy would be made to a supply-shock that embodied a relative price 
shift. If the relative price of labor was going up due to structural reasons, and not simply as a response to broader 
price pressures, the central bank could accommodate the relative price shift by only gradually tightening in response 
to any inflationary effects and largely withholding any interest-rate response unless/until there were “second-round 
effects” of the wage increase on inflation expectations.   7
since the mid-1980s, suggesting that in recent years wage restraint has been ample and that the 
real wage gap therefore is not the source of current unemployment.
14 The relevant point for our 
analysis is that we focus on year-to-year wage restraint because it is of declared and 
demonstrated importance to monetary policy decisions, not because it is necessarily an optimal 
intermediate target for central banks or because it is welfare enhancing in and of itself. 
Operationally, we define wage restraint as the difference between the rate of real wage 
growth and productivity growth for a given country in a given year. A negative (positive) 
observation indicates below (above) productivity wage growth. We use two  measures of 
productivity from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). One is 
multifactor productivity (MFP) growth resulting as the residual from the OECD’s growth 
accounting exercises; the other is growth in GDP per hour worked, calculated from national 
accounts data. The two measures are highly though not precisely correlated for multiyear 
averages, so we report all results below for both measures (where data are available). For 
consistency, we also rely on the OECD’s total compensation per employee measure from its 
Economic Outlook as the source for our wage data. While we also undertook parallel 
investigations with the OECD’s more narrowly defined “wage rate, business sector” series, we 
prefer total compensation because the data coverage is more complete and because the anecdotal 
evidence is that central banks pay more attention to changes in total compensation than in wages 
per se. Also, arguably there are wage negotiations where wage increases are kept low, but 
additional benefits with regard to pensions or the like are part of the package. To get real wage 
growth, we deflate each observation by the country-specific deflator (productivity growth is of 
course automatically in real terms). 
Table 1 presents basic data on wage restraint for our full sample of 21 countries, 
comprising the 12 eurozone members, the three EU members outside the eurozone (Denmark, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom), and six other advanced economies (Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Norway, Switzerland, and the United States). For three (Luxembourg, Norway, and 
Switzerland), data are available only on GDP per hour growth and not on MFP growth. Since the 
focus of the paper is on the impact of EMU on wage restraint, we compute annual averages for 
                                                 
14 The outlier status of the US economy with regard to income and wealth inequality is not attributable to wage 
restraint either. As Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) and Piketty and Saez (2006) recently demonstrated, the large 
increase in income going to the top 1 and 0.1  percent of earners in the United States over the recent decade is 
largely due to the extraordinary rise in executive pay cumulated over several years.   8
the pre-euro (1991–98) and post-euro (1999–2003 or 2004) periods, subject to data availability. 
The mean and median change in wage restraint in the sample is negative, meaning greater 
restraint in the post-euro period, for both measures of productivity. On productivity measured by 
MFP, the mean change is just short of being significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
significance level (it is at the 7 percent significance level) and on the order of one percentage 
point (of the gap between productivity and wage growth) per year. Two countries, Greece and 
Sweden, show a significant increase in wage restraint under both measures, and two, Australia 
and the Netherlands, show a significant decrease in restraint under both measures, as can be seen 





III.  FIVE THEORIES OF THE DETERMINANTS OF WAGE RESTRAINT 
 
At any given moment, both unions and individual workers are conducting wage negotiations 
with employers. Results of most negotiations are determined by idiosyncratic factors specific to 
sectors, firms, or individuals. Other negotiations are largely determined by automatic factors like 
cost of living allowances (COLAs), although their significance has declined since the 1970s. The 
overall macroeconomic environment, including productivity growth, however, also plays a role 
in wage negotiations, particularly since individual or industry productivity is often difficult to 
verify in real time. As bargaining becomes more collective and centralized, and especially when 
it takes place at a national level, such aggregate measures take on an even greater importance. 
Similarly, as central banks become more focused on maintaining low inflation (rather than 
reducing high inflation or pursuing other medium-term goals), the extent of wage pressures 
relative to productivity growth across the economy becomes a more salient issue. From these 
rather innocuous observations arise a number of theories about how labor and monetary 
institutions should influence wage restraint. Table 2 summarizes these theories with their 
empirical implication for restraint and whether they apply solely to eurozone members. 
                                                 
15 Greece clearly has by far the largest change in wage restraint. Dropping Greece from our sample would of course 
drive down the average change observed but also decrease the standard deviation of changes observed, so the 
number of (eurozone) countries showing a significant increase in wage restraint in fact rises in that subsample. 
Details available from the authors upon request.   9
The first set of theories builds directly on Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and concerns the 
extent to which unions take into account the inflationary impact of their wage bargains as a 
function of their membership. The more encompassing the membership (i.e., the greater the 
share of workers represented by the union), the more the union internalizes the cost of inflation 
induced by wage pressures and thus the more likely it is to exercise wage restraint.
16 In 
particular, Cukierman and Lippi (1999, 2001) and Iversen and Soskice (1998, 2000) develop 
models of games between the ECB and unions as compared with the form of wage bargaining 
within countries before EMU. Both sets of papers predict that after EMU there will be a 
coordination problem. Unions that used to be large relative to their respective country’s total 
labor force, and whose bargaining their respective country’s central banks would have to take 
into account as a result when the latter was focused on national inflation rates, will after EMU 
become small(er) relative to the eurozonewide labor market and will not have to be taken into 
account by an ECB focused on eurozonewide inflation.  
As a result, these models predict that wage restraint will decline after EMU. Unions’ 
incentives for wage restraint are reduced in two ways: one, “excessive” wage demands will have 
less effect on overall inflation so the cost to the unions’ members will be lower; two, and 
probably more importantly, wage restraint from unions within one country will be less likely to 
induce monetary ease from the ECB—and therefore growth and employment increases—that 
benefits their members because the impact on eurozone-wide inflation will be smaller (countries 
where unions were already small or decentralized or absent would simply move further toward 
irrelevance for ECB monetary policymaking). So economies of large size before EMU where the 
central bank pursued an independent (nationally oriented as opposed to exchange-pegged) 
monetary policy should exhibit a significant decrease in wage restraint post-EMU—and this 
should be most marked in Germany, where not only was the economy the largest, while the 
Bundesbank most clearly took into account domestic wage developments when setting policy, 
but also the unions were large, and there was (is) nationwide wage bargaining. There is no reason 
to think that this shift should affect non-eurozone member countries. 
                                                 
16 In their famous U-shaped curve, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) suggest that extreme decentralization of wage 
bargaining will also lead to wage restraint because atomistic workers bargaining individually cannot drive up 
inflationary pressures. For purposes of considering the effects of EMU, the issue is whether economies on the 
“right” side of the hump with more concentrated wage bargaining move toward the suboptimal center where less 
internalization takes place, so we focus on that end here.   10
The second set of theories relates to the degree of international competition in product 
markets and was formalized by Danthine and Hunt (1994). In this framework, unions have some 
concern for the employment of their membership and recognize that employment will in part 
depend upon the price competitiveness of their home country’s firms on world markets.
17 If 
wage increases outstrip productivity while other countries’ producers benefit from wage 
restraint, the home country producers could lose market share, and the union members could lose 
jobs. As a result, the greater the exposure to international competition, the greater the wage 
restraint (Danthine and Hunt [1994] portray this as a shift in the Calmfors-Driffill curve). In the 
context of EMU, we can derive the prediction that to the extent that the introduction of the euro 
increased intra-eurozone trade, whether through increased transparency, lower transaction costs, 
orother means, there should be greater wage restraint within the eurozone.
18 
A third set of theories comes more directly out of the political science tradition, though 
economists on the left in Europe sometimes support it. In this approach, the models of games 
between the ECB and labor unions become matters of outright bargaining between interest 
groups—where the ECB (like most central banks) is characterized as emphasizing inflation 
versus growth and employment objectives, while the labor representatives pursue the reverse 
(Garrett 1998, Hibbs 1987).  The greater the political pull of the unions vis-à-vis the central 
bank, whether through threat of direct action because of union density and centralization or via 
the influence of elected representatives favoring union objectives, the lower the wage restraint 
because the central bank would be less willing (politically able) to “cut-off” growth in the 
economy. Absent the threat to tighten policy, the central bank would be unable to prevent a rise 
in labor share, which would mean real wage growth outpacing productivity. This approach 
would predict that after EMU, wage restraint would increase because the ECB would be less 
accountable to democratic control (given its insulation from national politicians), and there is no 
comparable Europe-wide labor institution to bargain on workers’ behalf. In particular, the 
countries where unions were more centralized and thus had greater political influence at home 
should see the greatest declines in wage restraint post-EMU. 
                                                 
17 Katzenstein (1984) first suggested this feedback effect in his study of small states in world markets. Such 
internalization of competitiveness concerns, however, is also a staple of policy discussions where there is tripartite 
bargaining. See, for example, Honohan and Lane’s (2002) depiction of the role of negotiated wage restraint in 
providing the conditions for the recent Irish miracle. 
18 The discussion of the size of the increase in intra-European trade due to the adoption of the euro remains lively, 
with some very large estimates (e.g., Rose 2000) offered. See Baldwin (2005) and Frankel (2005) for a constructive 
debate over the accumulated empirical evidence.   11
A fourth set of theories has more to do with globalization and its impact on industrial 
democracies in general than with EMU per se. Given the effective rise in labor supply from 
emerging markets, which competes with production workers in advanced economies, and the 
increase in international capital mobility and institutions that make shifting of production to 
lower-cost sites easier, first-world workers face increasing pressure to remain competitive, if not 
decrease their unit labor costs. Add to this the more general trend toward deunionization in the 
major economies, or at least their private sectors, and the pressure for wage restraint should 
increase (Dumont, Rayp, and Willemé 2006).
19 This set of theories is in many ways parallel to 
the second set of theories regarding openness to competition, but rather than emphasizing the 
change in incentives for given union structures and densities, this framework suggests a decline 
in those union densities. Thus the empirical prediction of this approach is that wage restraint 
should increase—both in and outside the eurozone—but primarily for the larger countries where 
labor was less subject to international competitive pressure in the past than in small countries 
that are already open. 
The final set of theories of the determinants of wage restraint are those proposed by 
monetary economists and central bankers suggesting positive structural effects from EMU (e.g., 
European Monetary Institute 1998).  In this framework, in economies where the central bank’s 
commitment to price stability was less than credible, unions and workers had less incentive to 
take into account the costs of their own pursuit of inflationary wage settlements. On the one 
hand, their real wages were more likely to be eroded by increases in inflation, which would arise 
out of others’ wage and price expectations (and negotiations), so union negotiators would feel 
they had more at risk from wage restraint; on the other hand, the likelihood of short-term costs to 
employment from “excessive” wage settlements would be lower because the central bank would 
be less credible in its threats to tighten policy should wage pressures rise.
20 This is the converse 
of the Bundesbank story behind the first set of theories discussed and as such is usually thought 
of as applying to Italy, for example, in the postwar period through the 1970s (or later). A rise in 
the credibility of central banks’ commitment to price stability should therefore induce greater 
wage restraint by reducing the fear that restraint will be self-defeating and increasing the fear 
                                                 
19 Whether the trend to deunionization is a result of these forces or is itself an independent cause, at least in part, is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
20 Obviously, we do not assume a stable trade-off between inflation and unemployment or the absence of costs to 
inflation, hence the mention of “short-term costs to employment,” since presumably central bank laxity would at 
some point induce real costs either from extra inflation and/or sharper tightening of policy.   12
that the central bank will not accommodate wage increases. This theory’s empirical prediction is 
that wage restraint should increase most for those countries that have the greatest increases in 
monetary credibility, whether through membership in EMU or through other means (such as the 
adoption of an inflation target). 
 




As discussed above, the limited number of observations available when considering these issues 
among the industrialized democracies encourages prudence in the use and interpretation of 
econometric analysis. Accordingly, when trying to sort out the impact of EMU on wage restraint, 
and the various theories of the determinants of wage restraint discussed in the preceding section, 
we stick to a simple approach. For those countries for which we have pre- and post-EMU 
average wage restraint observations (a total of 18),
21 we estimate ordinary least squares 
regressions of the form: 
 
∆WR = β0 + β1*eurodum + β2*(union variable) + β3*(union variable*eurodum)  
+ β4*(∆monetary credibility) + β5*(∆monetary credibility*eurodum) + ε (1) 
 
where “eurodum” denotes membership in the eurozone, “union variable” is a measure of union 
density or centralization or coordination (taken from the literature), and  “∆monetary credibility” 
is a measure of the change in the credibility of the central bank’s commitment to price stability 
between the two periods.  
We use different trade union variables as a robustness check of our results. The first 
indicator is “trade union density,” obtained from the OECD’s Employment Outlook 2004, which 
utilized survey results to calculate this variable. We use the data on density in 1990 and 2000, 
labelling the variable “TUdense” in the estimation output. As a separate variable to control for 
trade union influence, we also use collective bargaining coverage, which is expressed as the 
fraction of the total labor force covered by collective bargaining. The OECD compiled the 
                                                 
21 As shown in table 1, we are missing observations for Luxembourg, Norway, and Switzerland.   13
collective bargaining coverage rates, which it took or estimated from several sources (including 
direct submissions from national governments). Wherever possible, coverage rates were adjusted 
for employees (particularly in the public sector) who do not have full rights to bargain, though 
some public-sector workers obviously do (OECD’s Employment Outlook 2004, chapter 3). Once 
again, we take values for 1990 and 2000 as pre- and post-EMU variables. Centralization  and 
coordination of wage bargaining are the final two measures of trade union sway. These are 
constructed using survey data, also from the OECD, and are presented in the form of a cardinal 
scale from 1 to 5, increasing in half-point increments to indicate greater 
centralization/coordination. 
We proxy the change in monetary credibility by the difference between monthly long-
term (10-year) government bond yields averaged for 1995m1 to 1997m12 and 1998m1 to 
2000m12.
22 A bigger difference indicates a larger decline in government bond rates and thus in 
inflation expectations and in doubts about the central bank’s commitment to price stability. As 
shown in figure 2, there is a wide range of changes, with almost all economies in the sample 
seeing a minimum drop in bond rates of 150 basis points between the two periods considered, 
due presumably to global changes in inflation, the business cycle, and international arbitrage as 
the US and Japanese rates sank. Within Europe, as one might expect, Italy had the largest gain in 
credibility from EMU (more than 200 basis points above the eurozone average), with Portugal 
and Spain gaining next most, and then Greece.
23  Notably, however, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom also had substantial drops in long bond rates, higher than the average eurozone 
member, over the period despite staying out of the eurozone. 
Given the predictions of the various theories as outlined in table 2, the effects of wage 
bargaining structure and density, conditional (or not) on eurozone membership, and of monetary 
credibility should allow us to distinguish between them (if the data are willing). Table 3 presents 
our results from these cross-sectional (not panel) estimates. The three sets of estimates present a 
consistent set of results. An increase in monetary credibility has a significant increasing effect (at 
the 5 percent significance level) on wage restraint, and this result is not dependent on eurozone 
                                                 
22 The data are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. The first average ends in 1997m12 to allow 
for changes in bond yields in anticipation of EMU, and the horizons are shorter before and after than the wage 
restraint horizons to focus on the credibility impact of monetary regime shifts at the time. 
23 Greece itself did not join the eurozone until January 2001, so the change seen here is assumed to have  captured 
only part of EMU’s impact on the economy’s inflation expectations, with markets discounting until membership was 
sure.   14
membership (the (b) estimations) but is associated with all variation in monetary credibility in 
the sample.
24 The effect is economically meaningful as well with a 100 basis point drop in long 
bond rates associated with a 0.42 percent increase in wage restraint (the differential between 
productivity growth and real wage growth in percent terms). Given an average for the sample of 
change (increase) in wage restraint of 0.68 percent, this is a substantial effect. Such a large effect 
associated with decreased long-term interest rates is consistent with the last of the theories 
discussed in the preceding section: that greater central bank credibility would induce greater 
wage restraint. Given the imprecise estimates of the constant terms and of most of the 
coefficients on the other explanatory variables, changes in monetary credibility alone appear to 
explain 40 percent of the cross-national variation in changes in wage restraint.
25 
Trade union density interacted with economy size (Tudense*gdp) shows up as significant 
in the third regression, with a negative sign (it also has a negative coefficient significant at the 10 
percent level in the first column, the other place it appears).  The magnitudes are quite small, 
however, with coefficient estimates on the order of 0.00001.  This would be weak evidence 
against the fourth set of theories discussed in the preceding section, since it implies that declining 
trade union density, conditional on being in a country large enough to have had some 
independence of labor supply, decreases wage restraint. It seems consistent with Calmfors-
Driffill’s underlying intuition that moving toward decentralization in the mid-range of 
unionization would reduce incentives to restraint. The average economic size in our sample is 
US$1,136.29 million (IMF’s World Economic Outlook 1999). This means that a fall in trade 
union density from the sample average of 40 to 20 percent would lead to a nontrivial decline in 
wage restraint of 0.16 percentage point. Yet for the hump-shape argument, it is a problem that 
the sample mean of the density is 40 percent, since that would seem to put any declines in 
density to the right of the hump and therefore likely to lead to greater restraint. 
Trade union density on its own, when not interacted with size of GDP, does not appear to 
be significant, just as the other measures of labor union organization and wage bargaining 
                                                 
24 Note that wage restraint is defined to be negative (it is wage growth minus productivity growth), so the more 
negative the number, the greater the restraint. This is why there is a positive coefficient on the credibility variable: 
cred1 is also negative, representing a fall in long-term rates from pre-EMU to post-EMU period. 
25 Given the size of the increase in intra-eurozone trade, this result seems to be a particularly clear rejection either of 
the hypothesis that an increase in trade openness and competition should increase wage restraint, or of the 
assumption that a removal of (intra-eurozone) currency variation should make trade more competitive.  The relative 
clarity of this result may be in part a function of the more direct measurement of this explanatory variable than of 
changes in labor market institutions.   15
centralization do not, whether interacted with economic size or eurozone membership. This 
result is inconsistent with the third set of theories in section II: that declining political power or 
centralization of unions after EMU insulated monetary policymaking from dealing with labor 
would explain the observed increase in wage restraint. The extent of trade within the eurozone 
(EMUtrade2), presumably the exposure to international competition most directly affected by the 
launch of the euro, also does not show up as having a significant effect on wage restraint, as 
opposed to the hypothesized positive coefficient.
26 As with the monetary credibility hypothesis, 
the determinants of wage restraint in the advanced countries appear on this data to be global (or 
by country) rather than associated with eurozone membership. 
Particularly striking is the apparent rejection of the best formally developed theories of 
determination of wage restraint: those hypothesizing that a coordination problem would arise 
after EMU with the countries previously having unions that were large enough to internalize the 
costs of “excessive” wage demands showing a decline in wage restraint. As suggested in table 1, 
which shows the sample averages, the cross-sectional analysis in table 3 confirms that there is no 
association between the centralization or coordination of wage bargaining, whether conditional 
on size or not, and wage restraint for eurozone members—or for any countries in the sample. 
Since two distinct sets of models (Cukierman and Lippi 1999, 2001; Iversen and Soskice 1998, 
2000) both make the strong prediction that wage restraint should have gone down after EMU, in 
contrast to the other theories predicting conditional increases in restraint—and instead wage 
restraint went up on average, and significantly so even when taking account of the institutional 
factors underlying these models—it seems time to reconsider those models. Before doing so, 
however, we turn to time-series data to examine from another angle the empirical validity of the 
clear and contrasting predictions of the first (wage restraint down conditional on EMU and wage 
bargaining structure) and last (wage restraint up conditional on change in monetary credibility 




                                                 
26 Given the size of the increase in intra-eurozone trade, and the incidence of that expansion only for eurozone 
members, this result appears to be a particularly clear rejection of the trade competition increases restraint 
hypothesis.  The relative clarity of this result may in part be a function of the more direct measurement of this 
explanatory variable than of the coding of labor market institutions, however.   16
V. TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF WAGE RESTRAINT IN GERMANY AND ITALY 
 
We are now into the seventh year since the launch of the euro. It is feasible to undertake time-
series analysis of even low-frequency data that span the periods before and after EMU, in order 
to look for EMU’s impact. With regard to wage restraint, the question is whether the adoption of 
the euro made any difference to year-by-year wage negotiations, given expected central bank 
reactions or nonreactions according to some theories. In the previous section we analyzed 
differences in multiyear averages for a set of 18 countries; in this section we turn to cyclical 
variation (or not) in wage restraint as a function of interest rates and structural factors for a pair 
of countries from 1980 to 2003. While we leave for future research the estimation of the 
interaction between central bank reaction functions and wage equations, we hope to distinguish 
between the factors affecting wage restraint by carefully choosing the cases to consider. 
Comparing the time-series behavior and determinants of wage restraint in Germany and 
Italy should allow us to see which effects of the euro are and are not evident. Germany was the 
economy with the de facto anchor currency of the pre-euro European Monetary System and had 
some of the largest unions with some of the most centralized and coordinated wage bargaining 
institutions in Europe. This combination of central bank independence (legally and in interest-
rate setting) with centralized wage bargaining should have produced great incentives for wage 
restraint in Germany pre-EMU, according to the theories that emphasized incentives for union 
internalization of inflation costs. By the same token, the entry of Germany into the eurozone 
should have produced a marked drop in wage restraint—the German unions became notably 
smaller relative to the economic zone relevant for monetary policymaking, and monetary 
policymaking shifted away most clearly from a focus on German domestic inflation. In short, if 
the Cukierman-Lippi/Iversen-Soskice story in the spirit of Calmfors and Driffill should show up 
anywhere, it should be in a significant decline in wage restraint in Germany post-EMU. For fans 
of the monetary credibility story, there should either be no effect (assuming, as bond markets 
indeed seem to, that the ECB has just as credible a commitment to price stability as the 
Bundesbank did) or a slight decline in wage restraint. 
For Italy, a different set of expectations is generated. As shown in figure 2, Italy enjoyed 
the largest credibility gain for its monetary policy commitment to low inflation upon admission 
to the eurozone.  Prior to this credibility gain, Italy should have exhibited low wage restraint   17
according to the theories emphasizing monetary credibility. In an economy where indexing was 
rife and inflation expectations were high and unanchored, there should have been little incentive 
for unions to exercise wage restraint—and little reason to think that the central bank would 
tighten policy in response to excessive wage growth.
27 After EMU, with a large gain in 
counterinflationary credibility for Italian monetary policy (set by the ECB), Italian unions and 
wage bargainers should have shown a significant increase in wage restraint.  
Even if the ECB were not setting policy on the basis of Italian wage developments, the 
eurozone more generally would be following a policy consistent with price stability, while the 
Italian economy would no longer be able to devalue or inflate at (political) will. If the monetary 
credibility story in the spirit of the postwar Bundesbank beliefs should show up anywhere, it 
should be in an increase in wage restraint in Italy post-EMU. Of course, according to the wage 
bargaining coordination problem theories, Italy as a large economy should be subject to a lesser 
version of the same phenomenon besetting German wage bargaining with the move into the 
eurozone and so should show no effect on, or a slight decrease in, wage restraint post-EMU. 
To examine the determinants of wage restraint in these two critical country case studies, 
we look at annual data from 1980 to 2003 for compensation and productivity growth. In contrast 
to the cross-sectional data on multiyear averages, here we utilize annual nominal compensation 
growth (from OECD World Economic Outlook no. 78) along with contemporaneous GDP per 
hour growth (from Groningen Growth and Development Centre Total Economic database as 
discussed in the previous section) to construct wage restraint. The switch from nominal to real 
wages is to take into account the money illusion and more broadly the difficulty for workers and 
unions in discerning real productivity growth in real time. The actual computations of real GDP 
per hour or of the residual from growth regressions that economists produce and we use above 
only appear with a lag usually of several months to actual events, whereas often wage 
negotiations are on an annual or two- to three-year basis and are conducted in nominal terms. 
To examine the competing hypotheses, we estimate on German and Italian data 
separately regressions of the form: 
 
                                                 
27 Some commentators will insist that the Banca d’Italia did have significant counterinflationary credibility from the 
time of its “divorce” from the Italian Treasury or with the advent of later reforms. This begs credulity, given the 
revealed drop in long bond rates upon eurozone entry and the prior devaluations from the exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM)—let alone the desire of Banca d’Italia senior officials to gain eurozone entry.   18
WR = β0 + β1*Output Gap + β2*inflation expectations + β3*EMU dummy  
+ β4*nominal central bank interest rate + β5*additional variables + ε (2) 
 
where the additional variables include trade within the European Union, trade union density, and 
the spread between the country’s and Swiss long-term bond rates as a proxy for the nation’s 
central bank credibility. In the absence of time-series data on trade union density, we use the 
share of private-sector employment in the economy. Inflation expectations were obtained by 
Chinn and Frankel (2003) —they take the average of month-to-month annual consumer price 
index growth at 12-month leads and use it as an inflation expectation proxy. Our main interest is 
to see whether the EMU dummy is significant and negative, particularly for Germany, which 
would be consistent with the wage coordination story, or significant and positive, particularly for 
Italy, which would be consistent with the monetary credibility story. 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for Germany and Italy respectively. All regressions 
have 24 observations except those in column II of each table, where data limitations on the trade 
union density variable limit us to 13 observations. For Germany (table 4), we find the only factor 
significantly affecting wage restraint is the central bank instrument interest rate (which is 
consistent with the Bundesbank wage restraint and deterrence story), with rises in that rate 
increasing restraint. Interestingly, the sole significance of this variable does not change after 
EMU, seemingly implying that German wage bargainers continue to keep their eye on the ECB 
response to their negotiations much as they did on the Bundesbank’s response. Surprisingly, 
even the German output gap and inflation expectations have no significant direct effects on wage 
restraint in Germany. There is no evidence in any of the estimates that a structural break 
occurred around German economic unification in 1990–91, so we do not report separate results. 
This is not entirely surprising given the small share and separation of the eastern German labor 
market in overall German employment. Finally, there is evidence of a statistically significant 
(but not economically large) effect of the public budget deficit on wage bargaining (model VI), 
where a larger deficit increases wage restraint, perhaps in anticipation of either budget cutbacks 
or monetary response. This factor also accounts reasonably well for year-to-year variation in 
wage restraint in Germany in all estimates I-V even though the central bank interest rate is the 
sole significant explanator   19
For Italy (table 5), unemployment turns out to be a better measure than the output gap of 
the importance of the business cycle and has a consistently significant effect in the intuitive 
direction: an increase in unemployment increases wage restraint. Meanwhile EMU membership 
per se does not come in significantly for Italy, nor does the central bank interest rate itself—
perhaps reflecting the de facto lack of independence of Italian monetary policy over the period. 
A direct measure of inflation expectations, however, is estimated to have a significant (5 or 10 
percent level) and positive coefficient across most specifications, including ones where the EMU 
dummy is included, meaning that when there is a decrease in inflation expectations, wage 
restraint increases. In a similar spirit, the spread between the Italian and Swiss long-term 
government bond rates has a significant positive coefficient; when the spread increases, 
consistent with a decline in Italian monetary credibility, wage restraint diminishes. That this 
shows up strongly in Italy is consistent with the predictions of the monetary credibility theory of 
wage restraint. Unlike in Germany, there is no evidence that budget deficits have any effect on 




VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Enhanced monetary credibility, as proxied by the decrease in the long government bond rate 
after the launch of the euro, can explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in 
the observed increase in wage restraint seen in European countries since 1999. The effect of 
monetary credibility on wage restraint is not limited to eurozone members, though; countries 
such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, which had a similarly measured gain in central bank 
commitment to price stability, also saw similar significant increases in wage restraint. This effect 
occurred completely independently of the wage bargaining institutions in the countries involved. 
In fact, in contradiction of the theories that suggested a coordination problem would emerge 
post-EMU between labor representatives and the ECB in large economies where bargaining was 
centralized and conducted with their national central banks prior to EMU, there is no evidence of 
a decline in wage restraint in those countries. A closer look at time-series evidence for Germany, 
                                                 
28 In both the German and Italian time series, one might expect the trade union coordination, centralization, and 
density variables to have limited explanatory power given their limited variation over the period.   20
where that hypothesized effect was supposed to be strongest, offers no support for the theories; 
time-series evidence for Italy on the variation of interest rate spreads over time, on the other 
hand, strongly supports the view that monetary credibility matters irrespective of wage 
bargaining arrangements. 
As always in this literature, given the limited sample of countries involved and the 
limited data (both cross-sectional and time-series) available on institutional change, these results 
cannot be taken as dispositive. Yet, despite the data limitations, the results presented here are 
surprisingly robust and clear, perhaps benefiting from the focus on the narrowly defined wage-
restraint variable. Given the strength of the predictions of the Cukierman-Lippi (1999, 2001) and 
Iversen-Soskice (1998, 2000) models that EMU should lead to a decline in wage restraint, 
particularly in large countries, the apparent rejection of those predictions should be taken 
seriously. The ECB has put a lower weight on individual countries’ cyclical and wage 
developments—particularly Germany’s—than the pre-EMU Bundesbank did when setting 
monetary policy (Posen and Popov Gould 2006; Hayo 2006), so the rejection is not because the 
ECB behaved contrary to expectations either in these models or more generally. 
For future research, then, these results lead naturally to questions of what on the labor 
institution side was at work that coordination problems did not arise in wage bargaining post-
EMU and, instead, wage restraint rose. When labor representatives appear on the basis of these 
results to be forward looking and concerned enough with macroeconomic conditions to respond 
to changes in counterinflationary credibility, it is somewhat surprising that the internalization 
dynamic for the effect of wage bargaining on inflation pressures does not carry through as well. 
Perhaps the labor representatives’ utility functions in the above models were simply 
misspecified, with too little regard for employment effects and too much for the costs of 
inflation. Shiller (1996) and survey work that followed established a healthy dislike for inflation 
among a wide range of the populace in many of the countries considered here, but that is not 
equivalent to establishing such a dislike among labor leaders, where anecdotal, political science, 
and historical evidence has tended to show labor as being far more concerned about output and 
employment than inflation (at least at low-to-moderate levels of inflation).  
Another related possibility is that the importance of these labor and union institutions in 
wage bargaining behavior was overestimated by theorists,   This could have occurred because 
actual coordination or centralization of labor bargaining in practice is fundamentally mis-  21
measured by the available coded classifications  More moderately, while these institutions could 
have had some sway, they also could have allowed for a great deal of variation in bargaining 
behavior over time, and those variations were not picked up in the available measures and thus 
drove down the estimates of the institutional codings’ impact our analyses. This scepticism may 
seem on the face of it unlikely, given the long emphasis on tripartite bargaining and corporatism 
in Europe, as well as the supposed recent successes of such mutual accommodation in Ireland, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden, and so the results here should not be used to impugn institutional 
factors altogether. Yet, it remains possible that the effect or effectiveness of these labor market 
institutions is endogenous to the political and economic forces in civil society and so produces 
the degree of wage restraint in keeping with the political pressures at any given time, largely 
irrespective of apparent form.
29 
In any event, it may be necessary to go beyond investigating wage restraint (let alone 
unemployment or inflation outcomes) at the national level and consider sectoral differences in 
both wage bargaining structures and degree of wage restraint. Such an approach might not only 
better distinguish between these potential explanations for the absence of impact of wage 
bargaining structures on changes in wage restraint in the OECD in the last 15 years but also 
allow for more direct grappling with the alternative hypotheses advanced in section III, 
particularly regarding the influence of globalization and competition on wage setting.
30  
For analysts of monetary policy, especially in the eurozone, at least one message is clear: 
The ECB has delivered wage restraint on the Bundesbank deterrence model where adoption of 
the euro led to credible declines in inflation expectations. This could be taken to indicate that 
concerns about establishing monetary toughness or the emergence of wage-push inflation 
pressures are unnecessary, especially since the adoption of inflation targeting in Sweden and the 
United Kingdom led to similar effects without any suggestion that they went through a similar 
proving process. 
                                                 
29 See Posen (1998b) for a general discussion of the endogeneity of institutional impact in political economy and 
macroeconomics. 
30 We are grateful to Philip Lane for this latter suggestion regarding globalization.   22
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VARIABLE LIST AND DATA SOURCES FOR CROSS-SECTION ANALYSIS
variable name variable label data source:
cntry country name
MFPnom wage restraint: nominal
compensation growth minus MFP
growth
GDPnom wage restraint: nominal
compensation growth minus GDP
p/h growth OECD Economic Outlook (compensation)
MFPreal wage restraint: real OECD Productivity DB (MFP, GDP p/h)
compensation growth minus MFP
growth
GDPreal wage restraint: real
compensation growth minus GDP
p/h growth
EMUtrade1 country's trade with eurozone
countries, avrg 1995-1998 IMF's DOTS database
EMUtrade2 country's trade with eurozone
countries, avrg 1999-2004
cred1 credibility gain from euro -
pre-emptive convergence assumed govt long-term govt bond yield data from IMF's
cred2 credibility gain from euro - NO IFS database
pre-emptive convergence assumed
central1 centralization of bargaining -
1990-1994
central2 centralization of bargaining -
1995-2000
coordin1 coordination index - 1990-1994 Driffill, John (2005) "The Centralization of wage
coordin2 coordination index - 1995-2000 bargaining revisited. What have we learned?"
collect1 collective bargaining coverage 1990
collect2 collective bargaining coverage 2000
Tudense Trade union density, 2000
gdp 1999 GDP, current prices, US$ IMF, World Economic Outlook Database
billions, (WEO)
tuXXgdp interacted term - TU density in
1990 or 2000, GDP
eurodum eurozone member dummy
cred1euro interacted credibility with
cred2euro euro dummy
central1gdp interacted centralization with gdp
central2gdp  
central1euro interacted centralization with euro d
central2euro  
coordin1euro interacted coordination with euro d
coordin2euro  
collect1gdp interacted collective bargaining cov.
collect2gdp    
   27
VARIABLE LIST AND DATA SOURCES FOR TIME SERIES ANALYSIS: GERMANY, ITALY




restr_l_r wage restraint-1 period lag of
productivity growth, real - Total Compensation data from OECD, Economic
compensation growth Outlook #78.
restr_c_n wage restraint-contemporaneous, - GDP p/h from: The Conference Board and
nominal compensation growth Groningen Growth and Development Centre,




nongovtempl share of total empl not in
public sector OECD, Economic Outlook #78
unempl unemployment rate
structdefchng % change in structural deficit
gdp gdp, billions, US$
TUden TU density
Visser, J. (2006) "Union member statistics in 24 countries", 
Monthly Labour Review
inflexpect inflation expectations IFS, 12m avrg of m-to-m CPI growth, 12m lead
r Buba/ECB money market interest
rate IMF, International Financial Statistics
spread Italian-Swiss LT govt bond
spread
trade_eu Italian trade with eurozone
countries-% GDP IMF, Direction of Trade database
trade_tot total Italian trade (X+M), % GDP
EMU start of EMUIII dummy  28
 
  Table 1   
 
Changes in average 
wage restraint   
  1991-98 vs. 1999-2004   
     
    
 Real  Comp-MFP 
Real Comp-
GDP p/h 
Australia (2)  0.010*  0.012* 
Austria (1)  -0.006  0.004* 
Belgium 0.004*  0.003 
Canada -0.007  -0.002 
Denmark 0.007*  0.003 
Finland -0.007  0.002 
France (2)  -0.009  -0.006 
Germany (3)  -0.003  0.004* 
Greece -0.093*  -0.096* 
Ireland -0.001  -0.001 
Italy -0.007  -0.006 
Japan (2)  -0.015  -0.015 
Luxembourg n.a.  0.004* 
Netherlands 0.011*  0.010* 
Norway n.a.  0.003* 
Portugal (1)  -0.006  0.002 
Spain (2)  -0.012  -0.010 
Sweden -0.025*  -0.021* 
Switzerland n.a.  -0.017* 
United Kingdom  -0.022*  -0.015 
United States  -0.004  -0.008 
    
Avrg of EU12  -0.0117  -0.0086 
Avrg of non-EU12  -0.0079  -0.0065 
    
Mean  -0.0102 -0.0068 
Standard Error  0.0054 0.0046 
Median  -0.0065 -0.0013 
Confid, Lvl. 95.0%  0.0113 0.0096 
    
NOTES:    
Differences between 1991-98 and 99-2004 averages of 
productivity growth and compensation growth    
are subtracted from each other.    
* signifies significantly different from the mean, at 5%    
(1) - MFP growth 1996-1999 average    
(2) - MFP growth 1999-2002 average;  (3) - 1992-1998 
average      29
    
    
    
Table 2 
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